ing and Equilibrium Selection ” and Kamada and Sugaya’s “Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline:

We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the ac-tions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally revised action is taken at the deadline. In two-player “common inter-est ” games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In “opposing in-terest ” games, which are 2 × 2 games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically unique and corre-sponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium pre-vails depends on the payoff structure and on the relative frequency of the arrival